GUINEA, YET ANOTHER LEOPARD CHANGE

On 18 October 2021 / Dossier Destination Sahel, Geopolitics, IBI World France / Leave a comment

It is Sunday morning, 5 September 2021, and in the Kaloum district of Conakry, numerous gunshots can be heard: more than 500 ‘red berets’, riding on military vehicles that left before dawn from the Forecariah base to occupy the country, are storming the Presidential Palace of Sékhoutouréya and, after a gunfight, capture President Alpha Condé[1]. The people in the streets applaud[2].

The first official news is conflicting: the Ministry of Defence speaks of a repelled attack, but in the late afternoon, State TV broadcasts a video in which Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya, at the head of a self-styled National Committee for Reconciliation and Development[3], personally gives the news of the dismissal of President Alpha Condé[4].

This was followed by the announcement of border closures and the suspension of the Constitution, and, last but not least, the proclamation ‘We will no longer entrust politics to one man; we will entrust it to the people’. Because Alpha Condé is hated by most of the people, who celebrate: there is no news of the president for hours, then a video appears on the internet in which he appears dejected, half-lidded on an armchair, barefoot, jeans and shirt badly buttoned, apparently in good health and surrounded by soldiers[5]. This brings to an end a period of 11 years during which, after yet another coup d’état, Condé’s government should have been the first democratic government, the one that would have brought Guinea out of decades of misery and pain.

Stories of ordinary violence

Guinea, despite its mineral wealth, is one of the poorest countries in West Africa[6]

Guinea, the size of the United Kingdom, has a steadily increasing population of almost 14 million people[7] and is one of Africa’s least developed nations, with 55% of its inhabitants living in extreme poverty[8]. Yet it has large reserves of high-quality iron ore, graphite, nickel and cobalt, as well as gold, diamonds and other precious stones[9]. It is mainly bauxite that plays a leading role, and it is thanks to the recent resumption of exports of this mineral that the economy has been growing since at least 2020[10]: but, as happens all too often in these latitudes, the citizens seem to be the last to benefit.

Guinea is bordered by Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all areas that have lived with bitter civil wars for at least thirty years, and where respect for human rights remains a distant goal[11] and crime[12], corruption[13], human trafficking[14] and drug trafficking[15] have some of the worst rates on the planet. It is one of the African states that are the offspring of French colonialism, which conquered it in 1898 after a battle against Samory Turé, emperor of the state of Wassoulou[16]. A long French negotiation with the United Kingdom, which controls Sierra Leone, Portugal, which owns Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, led to the definition of the current borders, which were drawn ignoring, as always, the local communities[17].

Following the collapse of the Fourth French Republic, President Charles de Gaulle offered the colonies the choice between joining a new federal community or independence. Guinea had no doubts: thanks to the awareness campaign led by Ahmed Sékou Touré with the African Democratic Rally, de Gaulle’s offer was rejected outright: Guinea was the only colony in Africa to reject the proposal and choose complete independence, proclaiming itself a sovereign republic on October 2, 1958[18].

Ahmed Sékou Touré was elected president on 15 January 1961[19] and pursued a socialist economic line, the result of French trade unionist influences: an anti-colonial hero and supporter of “Pan-Africanism”, he turned out to be a despot and a torturer, accused of the disappearance of 50,000 people and the desperate flight of hundreds of thousands from the country[20]. The economic failure leads the country to isolation: of his reputation as a liberator, gained during the years of decolonisation, nothing will remain. His last act, with the country bankrupt, is a conversion to western capitalism[21], but it is too late to see any results: he dies in March 1984 in Cleveland during heart surgery[22].

A week later, in a coup d’état, a military junta led by Colonel Lansana Conté takes power[23]. The first acts were the suspension of the Constitution and the abolition of the PDG (the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, with which the former president governed) and all the revolutionary committees connected to it, replacing them with the Military Committee for National Recovery (Comité Militaire de Reddressement National, CMRN)[24]. After seven years of heavy military dictatorship, a new constitution was passed in 1991 to begin the transition to civilian rule; in 1992, political parties were legalised and in 1993 Guinea’s first multi-party elections were held where Conté was elected president with 51.7% of the vote[25].

His economic project was as disastrous as his predecessor’s, and Conté, lacking popular support, ruled by force and repression, so much so that in 1996 he had to repel the mutiny of thousands of soldiers[26]. Despite having managed to prevent the coup, Conté is forced to change pace, and new strategies lead to progressive improvements that allow him, in the following elections in 1998, to be re-elected: a second mandate characterised by a season of clientelism, corruption and serious economic recession[27].

A rebel commando from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)[28]

In 2000, the rebel army of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), backed by Liberian President Charles Taylor, launched attacks in Guinea and neighbouring countries[29]. The rebels, whose ranks include guerrillas from Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Liberia, known for their brutal actions, put the town of Guéckédou and other villages to the sword[30]. Conté accuses Liberians and Sierra Leoneans living in Guinea of fomenting the war and launches a vast operation of round-ups, arrests, torture, rape and “sham” trials against them[31]. A tide of people fleeing Guinea, estimated by the UNHCR at hundreds of thousands, is on the move[32].

Elections are just around the corner: Conté, already in his second term, cannot run again, so he launches a constitutional referendum (2001) to cancel this limit: the result, deemed to be the result of fraud, proves him right[33]. The legislative elections, originally scheduled for 2000, were held in June 2002 and were won by Conté amidst a boycott by the main opposition parties, who denounced strong distortions in the electoral mechanism[34].

During his third term of office, President Conté continued to prove himself: increasingly despotic, he fostered corruption, worsened the country’s socio-economic conditions and fuelled increasingly strong disagreements with the opposition[35]. Having survived an assassination attempt in January 2005, in 2007 he faced new army mutinies[36], strikes and major protests that were bloodily repressed[37]. But it was the end: increasingly weak and ill, he died in December 2008[38]. A few hours later, a military junta calling itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) announced its seizure of power[39].

In a communiqué broadcast on national TV, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara announced that the CNDD had ‘decided to put an end to the agony of the Guinean people’ by seizing power and removing Somparé, the interim president in charge – the constitution was suspended, political and trade union activity was banned on the promise of democratic elections within two years[40]. The next day, the CNDD chose Camara as its president. The newly-appointed president marched through the centre of Conakry amidst cheering crowds, while the international community condemned yet another coup d’état and the African Union suspended Guinea’s membership[41].

The Conakry stadium massacre

The bodies slaughtered in the Conakry stadium on 28 September 2009: over 150 dead and at least 1,000 injured[42]

The army that takes power is the same one that supported the regime of Lansana Conté, and is the same one involved in the bloody repression of the protests of January and February 2007, so things go on as before: on the 29th of September 2008, in fact, the massacre in the stadium of Conakry takes place. On the morning of that Monday, tens of thousands of people marched to the stadium to demonstrate against the military junta. At around eleven o’clock, the military fired tear gas at a peaceful, jubilant crowd, causing panic and a general stampede; but the exits are manned by the notorious red berets, police riot troops and dozens of irregulars wielding AK-47 machine guns; others attack with machetes, beat with truncheons, rip the clothes off dozens of women, raping them with rifle barrels, bayonets, shoes or pieces of wood; some protesters die crushed by the crowd[43].

The death toll, according to the government, is 57, but the real number is between 150 and 200, and there are over a thousand injured[44]. Dozens of bodies, according to Human Rights Watch, are hidden by Red Berets[45]. The international community responds with an EU arms embargo – which will be widely violated[46] – and a visa ban on Guinea’s military leaders[47]; the United States joins the measure[48], followed by the African Union, which imposes a freeze on bank accounts and travel visas for anyone connected with the junta[49].

On the 3rd of December 2009 Camara fell victim to an internal feud: Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakite, former head of the presidential guard, shot the president[50] who accused him of being the director of the massacre in the Conakry stadium – Camara, seriously wounded, was taken to a hospital in Rabat, Morocco, and his place was taken by the vice-president and minister of defence, Sékouba Konaté[51].

In January 2010, Camara appeared in public at an airport in Burkina Faso, battered and held so as not to fall[52]. Burkina Faso’s foreign minister confirmed that he would spend his convalescence in Ouagadougou[53], but this turned into exile, even though his supporters said that during those months he would begin to fight, from afar, for a democratic transition[54]. On 21 January 2010, the military junta appointed Jean-Marie Doré as Prime Minister until democratic elections were held on 27 June, won in the second round by Alpha Condé, amidst the usual allegations of electoral fraud[55].

The first democratic government

Alpha Condé, first democratically elected president of Guinea in 2010[56]

Born in 1938, the new president was born in Boke, in the former French Guinea, into a Burkina Faso family. A teacher, he graduated from the Sorbonne’s Faculty of Law[57] and from the Institute of Political Science in Paris, and began his political career by leading the FEANF (Federation of Black African Students in France)[58] in 1963. Together with other Guinean exiles, such as Ibrahima Baba Kaké, Charles Diane, Ba Mamadou and Siradiou Diallo, he was sentenced to death in absentia in 1970 for his fierce opposition to the PDG of incumbent President Ahmed Sékou Touré[59].

In 1991 he returned to Guinea and was a member of the Rally of Guinean People. He was forced to flee to France, but returned to run for the presidential elections in 1993, where he won 19.55% of the vote, second place behind Lansana Conté[60]. He returned to France between 1994 and 1998, only to take part in the presidential elections in December 1998, where he came third with 16.5% of the vote[61]. Persecuted, he fled to the Ivory Coast disguised as a priest, was arrested and charged with subversion, smuggling of currency, violence against the police and recruiting foreign mercenaries to organise a coup d’état[62].

After 16 months of preventive detention, Condé was sentenced to five years in prison in August 2000 for sedition[63]. He was released in September 2001 after being tortured and having his sentence reduced with a promise to withdraw from the political scene[64]. He returned to France, where he remained until the referendum on constitutional amendments on 11 November 2001[65]. He ran again in the presidential elections on 27 June 2010 and won the ballot on 7 November with 53% of the vote against his opponent Cellou Dalein Diallo[66].

Despite the fact that this was the first democratic vote since independence in 1958, serious inter-ethnic tensions led to very serious disturbances during and after the elections, especially due to the age-old feud between the Malinke and Susu, Condé’s supporters, and the Pehul, Diallo’s supporters[67]. The police arrested 125 people (almost all Pehul) and indulged in barbaric violence: one man died in pre-trial detention and 14 others were illegally detained in an unauthorised military prison on the island of Kassa, infamous for its torture, which was closed down in January 2010[68]. Excessive violence by the security forces[69] highlights a country in disarray, in the grip of chaos. Condé represents hope, but the challenge to bring the country, and in particular the social question, back into balance is certainly arduous.

Guinea’s red gold

Simandou, the world’s largest iron ore mine, located in the Simandou mountain range in southeastern Guinea[70]

The mining sector is one of Alpha Condé’s primary concerns: a sector that for decades has produced enormous wealth that has not been redistributed, but is firmly in the hands of foreign companies and corrupt officials[71]. Guinea has the world’s largest bauxite reserves, located mainly in the Boké and Kindia regions of Guinée-Maritime[72]. It also has immense deposits of high quality iron between the Simandou, Zogota and Nimba mountains in Guinée-Forestière and has large reserves of gold and diamonds, particularly in the north-east[73].

Mining production, which accounts for 35% of GDP, is staggering: for bauxite, Guinea is the world’s leading producer, with 82 million tonnes in 2020, equivalent to 22% of world production[74]. For iron ore, it is estimated that in Simandou alone there is a stock of over 2 billion tonnes of high quality ore, the largest known deposit, but also the least exploited[75]. Gold production, according to the World Gold Council, stands at 56.9 tonnes in 2020 – seventh highest among African countries[76]. As for diamonds, estimated reserves are between 30 and 40 million carats proven and 500 million carats probable, while the country exported 270’157 carats of diamonds in 2018 worth $20 million and 136’072 carats of diamonds in 2020[77].

Mining trade with China alone is estimated at USD 3 billion per year: the country’s leading mining company, SMB-Winning, is co-financed by the Chinese[78]. Other companies present in Guinea are Chalco (Aluminium Corp of China)[79], Singapore’s Top International Holding[80], which owns two mines, in Boke and Boffa, and the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG)[81], co-owned by US aluminium giant Alcoa[82]. The Russians in Rusal also control three major bauxite mines and an aluminium refinery[83]. Rusali is the third largest aluminium producer in the world: 42% of the Russian giant’s bauxite supply comes exclusively from Guinean mines[84].

An enormous business, capable of boosting GDP figures which in 2010, when Alpha Condé came to power, stood at 4.8%, reaching 5.6% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2016[85]. Even in 2020, at the height of the pandemic, Guinea’s economic growth was 7%[86]. Yet even this country cannot escape the ‘resource curse’: the paradox of an abundance of natural resources (minerals, oil and gas) and the poverty of the population, as income from the mining sector ends up in corruption[87]. Thus, despite its immense mineral reserves and huge hydropower generation capacity, Guinea has negative world records in many key areas such as per capita income, infrastructure, education or health[88].

The lack of regulation turns the mining sector into a kind of Wild West, where private troops of foreign companies often face off in open firefights[89], and lengthy court cases involve courts around the world[90]. During the 26 years of the Touré presidency, the country closed its doors to international investors, but in 1981, following a coup d’état, the Ministry of Mines was created[91], which in 1986 published the first Mining Code[92], reducing the influence of the State and favouring the transfer of foreign capital (including the repatriation of profits) and prohibiting the nationalisation of licences given in concession[93].

But the new code is not very transparent (Article 13, for example, provides for the State to have the option to acquire an unspecified percentage of an exploitation concession[94]), so a new Mining Code is promulgated (1995), which will not serve to improve things and will therefore keep the mining giants away from Guinea[95]. Under Alpha Condé, the Mining Code underwent a profound transformation and in 2011 a new code of 221 articles, revolutionary compared to the previous ones[96], written with the advice of the billionaire George Soros[97], finally offered guarantees to foreign companies, but also demanded environmental protection obligations and the obligation to involve local communities in operations and earnings[98].

The BSGR-Steinmetz scandal

Beny Steinmetz awaits Israeli court hearing in 2017 in corruption case involving him and his company BSGR[99]

Condé, at the presentation of the new code, promised that it would ‘punish companies caught bribing officials and retroactively punish current licence holders if they were found to be involved in any corruption’[100]. The promise was kept: investigations by the Guinean judiciary uncovered acts of serious corruption involving Beny Steinmetz, a wealthy businessman who owes his vast fortune to diamonds and real estate, owner of BSGR Beny Steinmetz Group Resources, an oil and gas, mining, metals and energy company based on the island of Guernsey and currently in forced liquidation[101].

In 1997 Rio Tinto, the second largest mining company in the world after BHP[102], acquired the exploration contract for blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Simandou deposit under President Lansana Conté[103]. After more than a decade in which excavation was continually delayed and the environmental damage was enormous[104], in 2008 the Conakry government decided to confiscate Blocks 1 and 2 from the company and give them to BSGR for 160 million dollars[105] (it was later discovered that the concession was instead acquired completely free of charge[106]).

In April 2010, just 18 months after the acquisition, BSGR sold 51 per cent of its stake to Brazilian mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale)[107] for US$2.5 billion[108]. This is an extraordinarily profitable deal for Steinmetz, but also extraordinarily suspicious, because Steinmetz is paying Vale a $500 million down payment without any guarantee that the project will be carried out, and despite the fact that Vale has decided to have the extracted minerals transported to the Liberian port of Buchanan, and not to the Guinean ports, because the distance to be covered is less than half[109].

In February 2011, Condé demanded $1.25 billion from Vale and Steinmetz to comply with new legislation[110]. Soros came to mediate: Vale maintained the concession by paying only 250 million dollars, an amount that the company was willing to accept, but at the end of the negotiations the price rose to 500 million dollars and this time the request was rejected. Rio Tinto will be asked for 700 million dollars and the company, unlike Vale, accepts[111]. However, 120 million of this 700 million dollars does not end up in the State’s coffers, but disappears[112]. It was Soros who made public the obvious anomalies in the negotiations[113].

An internal investigation by the Mining Committee was launched and in October 2012 BSGR was accused, along with Vale, of corruption[114]. In April 2013, following a Grand Jury investigation in the USA, a Frenchman, Frederic Cilins, a BSGR consultant, is arrested in Florida on charges of obstructing a criminal investigation into potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and money laundering in connection with concession contracts for the Simandou mine[115].

George Soros meets Mamadie Touré in an attempt to find a compromise on Simandou[116]

Cilins allegedly bribed Mamadie Touré, one of Lansana Conté’s four wives: she received $2 million to destroy documents requested by the FBI in connection with the ‘Simandou’ investigation, and was promised a further $5 million if she was successful[117]. In July 2014, Cilins was sentenced to two years in prison, but only served one year[118]. It turns out that Mamadie Turé’s dealings with BSGR date back to 2006 when BSGR executive Asher Avidan negotiated on Simandou: these meetings enabled Steinmetz to obtain the concession for uranium exploration in Guinea, with a commercial agreement signed in June 2007 guaranteeing the dictator’s wife a 5% stake in BSGR as a “reward” for granting the concessions[119].

In 2014, Rio Tinto filed a lawsuit in the US against BSGR, Vale and Beny Steinmetz, accusing them of illegally snatching mining rights: the lawsuit was dismissed by the District Court of Conakry for lapse of time[120]. On 10 March 2016, Steinmetz was sentenced in absentia to 7 years in prison by Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate in connection with the “Prince Paul-Philippe Hohenzollern” case[121]. Shortly afterwards, he was arrested by the Israeli authorities on corruption charges in connection with the Simandou case, but only remained under house arrest for a fortnight[122]. Arrested again in August 2017 on charges of fraud and money laundering, he was released under a restraining order preventing him from leaving Israel[123].

In April 2017 BSGR files a lawsuit in the United States against George Soros, accused of manipulating the Guinean government and its officials to strip BSGR of its mining concessions, claiming compensation of $10 billion[124]. But in 2018, due to the difficulties generated by the Simandou affair, BSGR went into receivership[125]. Steinmetz does not give up: in August 2019, he arrives by private plane with former French President Nicolas Sarkozy at his side in Conakry, where they meet Alpha Condé[126].

The meetings yield an incredible agreement. Guinea rehabilitates Beny Steinmetz: the memorandum of understanding provides for BSGR to renounce all claims to Simandou, but at the same time offers Steinmetz the possibility of obtaining a new concession, the less valuable one of Zogota[127]. Soros is sentenced in Geneva on 22 January 2021 to five years in prison for corruption and money laundering – the fruit of his role in the Simandou deal[128].

Alpha Condé, a hope betrayed

Violent protests during the 2020 elections[129]

Steinmetz promises to appeal, but for now the convictions are the culmination of the largest corruption case ever recorded in the mining sector[130], and one from which Condé certainly does not emerge unscathed. During the years of his presidency, he was accused of corruption in the case of a $150 million credit obtained from Angola – some of the money, in 2012, allegedly ended up in his personal bank account[131]; he is accused of having had 75% of the cost of the presidential plane paid for by the owner of A.D. Consulting, the businessman who was in charge of the company. Consulting, the businessman and long-time friend Gaby Peretz[132]; he is accused of corruption in the China International Fund case which, when negotiating an agreement with Mohamed Condé, Alpha’s son, allegedly paid a $700 million bribe[133]; he is accused of corruption, in 2016, for $10.5 million in bribes apparently paid by Rio Tinto to François de Combret, an official very close to the president, for the rights to exploit the Simandou mines[134]; he is accused of corruption for having given the concession for the port of Conakry to the French industrialist Vincent Bolloré in exchange for “financial support”[135]; he is accused of corruption in the case of the Sable Mines mining concessions, on whose board of directors sits the businessman Phil Edmonds, a friend of Mohamed Condé[136]. Condé’s disastrous mandate ended on 5 September 2021 by one of his men, the one Condé considers the best: Lieutenant Colonel Mamady Doumbouya[137].

The end of his reign of terror surprisingly arouses general indignation and generates the threat of new embargoes from ECOWAS[138], the African Union[139], the United Nations[140] and the European Union[141], in stark contrast to the silence that accompanied the 60 years of dictatorship that preceded the coup.

ECOWAS, in its 2001 ECOWAS Protocol[142], has Article 1 (b) which states: “any rise to power must be through free, fair and transparent elections” and also “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”[143]. Condé, like his predecessors, was a despot who used any means to get re-elected, such as changing the constitution and exercising power with despotic violence and corruption. The European Union’s condemnation came only after the Conakry stadium massacre. The coup d’état follows two similar events in Mali and one in Chad that should have served as a lesson, because they all follow a very predictable dynamic.

So what can we expect from the new government? Although the coup was hailed by many civilians as a hope for change, unfortunately – as an academic research conducted by George Derpanopoulos, Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright for example states – it is to be expected that, following a rule that has never been broken, coups tend to install a new autocratic elite and expose citizens to higher levels of brutal repression[144]. And given the current disastrous situation in Guinea, the conditions for this to happen are all there. The only ones who seem to care about the destabilisation of Guinea are the big Russian and Chinese investors, almost certainly motivated by not entirely philanthropic feelings[145].

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Nigerian government have strongly condemned yesterday’s coup in the Republic of Guinea Conakry[146]

For one more time, in the history of mankind, we are faced with the case where it is necessary that, for nothing to change, everything seems to have been changed – this is the philosophy of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s famous novel, “The Leopard” (1959)[147], which has for over 60 years explained how this social dynamic works, and which is accompanied by the author’s terrible sentence, which also applies to poor and tormented Guinea: “Their vanity is stronger than their misery”[148]. A philosophy that, in Sicily as in Africa, generates barbarism and oppression.

So the international community is right in not believing in this umpteenth institutional upheaval. But it is no longer enough. Things must change first of all in the minds of the people, and Africans first of all. Let their elite, who study in our universities, learn something other than to dream of being the next Leopard.

[1] https://marketresearchtelecast.com/the-deep-crisis-that-shelters-the-coup-detat-in-guinea-conakry/154367/

[2] https://www.rt.com/news/534099-guinea-coup-transition-period/

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58453778

[4] https://www.timesofisrael.com/soldiers-in-guinea-overthrow-the-government-and-detain-countrys-president/

[5] https://walltrace.com/2021/09/president-alpha-conde-of-guinea-has-been-detained-as-a-result-of-a-military-coup/

[6] https://lecourrierdeconakry.com/le-gouvernorat-de-conakry-demande-aux-mendiants-de-liberer-les-places-publiques/

[7] https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/guinea-population/

[8] https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/least_developed_countries.htm

[9] https://www.metallirari.com/ricchezze-minerarie-mandingo-guinea/

[10] https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/guinea/guinea-economic-outlook

[11] https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guinea/

[12] https://www.numbeo.com/crime/in/Conakry

[13] https://tradingeconomics.com/guinea/corruption-rank

[14] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/webstories2018/unodc-intensifies-the-fight-against-trafficking-in-persons-in-guinea_-judges-and-prosecutors-meet-to-discuss-and-overcome-the-challenges-of-human-trafficking-cases.html

[15] https://www.lavocedelpatriota.it/l-africa-e-diventata-un-hub-del-narcotraffico-diretto-in-europa-anche-per-colpa-delleuropa/

[16] https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/19287/1/MacDonald_Mairi_S_200911_PhD_Thesis.pdf “The Challenge of Guinean Indrpendence – 1958-1971” – Mairi Stewart MacDonald

[17] https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/19287/1/MacDonald_Mairi_S_200911_PhD_Thesis.pdf “The Challenge of Guinean Indrpendence – 1958-1971” – Mairi Stewart MacDonald

[18] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sekou-Toure

[19] https://africanelections.tripod.com/gn.html#1961_Presidential_Election

[20] https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_key-dates-guinea-independence/6219276.html

[21] https://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0402/040237.html

[22] https://apnews.com/article/16048d20f4f86f57622723fed9f04804

[23] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/23/lansana-conte-profile

[24] https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea/Government-and-society

[25] https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve/1263

[26] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gn-conte.htm

[27] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gn-conte.htm

[28] https://alchetron.com/Revolutionary-United-Front

[29] https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/guinea-caught-conflict

[30] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gn-conte.htm

[31] https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1105806.html

[32] https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2001/1/3ae6b8295c/guinea-relief-effort-dramatically-scaled.html ; https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/guinea/guinea0701-02.htm

[33] http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2131_02.htm

[34] http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2131_02.htm

[35] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/23/lansana-conte-profile

[36] https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20090930_R40703_b172a1f095a9738fe6f6661c98d2ada95ddc393a.pdf “Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States” – Alexis Arieff and Nicolas Cook – Sept. 30, 2009 – page 12

[37] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/23/lansana-conte-profile

[38] https://www.france24.com/en/20081223-president-lansana-conte-dies-aged-74-

[39] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796902.stm

[40] https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20090930_R40703_b172a1f095a9738fe6f6661c98d2ada95ddc393a.pdf “Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States” – Alexis Arieff and Nicolas Cook – Sept. 30, 2009 – page 13

[41] https://www.refworld.org/docid/496c5c451e.html

[42] https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1361231/download

[43] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/12/downfall-3

[44] https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/guinea-september-28-massacre-was-premeditated

[45] https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/guinea-september-28-massacre-was-premeditated

[46] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/02/guinea-imports-arms-despite-embargo

[47] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/27/guinea-massacre-eu-ban

[48] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/12/downfall-3

[49] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLT440627

[50] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/16/guinea-aide-shoot-camara

[51] https://www.france24.com/en/20091216-former-aide-explains-why-he-tried-kill-junta-leader

[52] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/13/wounded-leader-guinea-reappears

[53] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/13/wounded-leader-guinea-reappears

[54] https://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/moussa-dadis-camara-6033.php

[55] https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea/Independence#ref1090986

[56] https://www.cameroonintelligencereport.com/guinea-president-alpha-conde-to-seek-third-term-despite-mass-protests/

[57] https://eng.rudn.ru/cooperation/honorary-doctors/alpha-conde/

[58] https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article159874

[59] https://books.google.it/books?id=TfcKAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false “Historical Dictionary Of Guinea” – Mohamed Saliou Camara, Thomas O’Toole, Janice E. Baker – 2013 – Scarecrow Press – page 91

[60] https://books.google.it/books?id=TfcKAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false “Historical Dictionary Of Guinea” – Mohamed Saliou Camara, Thomas O’Toole, Janice E. Baker – 2013 – Scarecrow Press – page 91

[61] https://books.google.it/books?id=TfcKAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false “Historical Dictionary Of Guinea” – Mohamed Saliou Camara, Thomas O’Toole, Janice E. Baker – 2013 – Scarecrow Press – page 91

[62] https://books.google.it/books?id=TfcKAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false “Historical Dictionary Of Guinea” – Mohamed Saliou Camara, Thomas O’Toole, Janice E. Baker – 2013 – Scarecrow Press – page 91

[63] https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/alpha-conde

[64] https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/alpha-conde

[65] https://books.google.it/books?id=TfcKAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false “Historical Dictionary Of Guinea” – Mohamed Saliou Camara, Thomas O’Toole, Janice E. Baker – 2013 – Scarecrow Press – page 91

[66] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11912834

[67] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/guinea-violence-election-alpha-conde

[68] https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/07/hrp00guinea.pdf

[69] https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/24/guinea-ensure-fair-trials-post-election-violence

[70] https://www.kapitalafrik.com/2019/11/21/guinea-long-deadlocked-simandou-mine-finds-taker/

[71] https://www.ft.com/content/fe6786ca-56cb-11e3-8cca-00144feabdc0

[72] https://www.invest.gov.gn/page/mining

[73] https://www.invest.gov.gn/page/mining

[74] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guineas-top-minerals-risk-after-coup-2021-09-06/

[75] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guineas-top-minerals-risk-after-coup-2021-09-06/

[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guineas-top-minerals-risk-after-coup-2021-09-06/

[77] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guineas-top-minerals-risk-after-coup-2021-09-06/

[78] http://www.smb-guinee.com/en/consortium-smb-winning/

[79] http://www.chalco.com.cn/en/

[80] https://www.topinternationalholding.sg/

[81] http://www.cbg-guinee.com/

[82] https://www.alcoa.com/guinea/fr

[83] https://rusal.ru/en/

[84] https://sicurezzainternazionale.luiss.it/2021/09/07/gli-interessi-economici-della-russia-nelle-riserve-bauxite-guinea/

[85] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=GN

[86] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=GN

[87] https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf

[88] https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poorest-countries-in-africa

[89] https://www.intelligenceonline.com/corporate-intelligence_the-red-line/2013/10/09/shadowy-battle-over-guinea-s-iron-ore-mountain,107980353-art

[90] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-steinmetz-timeline-idUSKBN29R2AA

[91] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[92] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[93] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[94] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[95] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[96] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[97] https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-guinea-conde-soros-20110302-idAFJOE72100X20110302 ; https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/parties_publications/C3765/Claimants%27%20Reply%20%28Redacted%20per%20PO8%29/Fact%20Exhibits/C-0233.PDF

[98] https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-mining-law-review/guinea-mining-law

[99] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/business/dealbook/beny-steinmetz-israeli-billionaire-detained.html

[100] https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-guinea-conde-soros-20110302-idAFJOE72100X20110302

[101] https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/bsgr

[102] https://www.companieshistory.com/rio-tinto/

[103] https://ejatlas.org/conflict/simandoun-mine

[104] https://ejatlas.org/conflict/simandoun-mine

[105] https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/steinmetz-sentenced-to-5-years-in-jail-in-swiss-bribery-case/46310450

[106] https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13216/Steinmetz_gets_five_years_for_bribery

[107] http://www.vale.com/en/business/mining/pages/default.aspx

[108] https://www.proactiveinvestors.com/companies/news/72814/brazils-vale-shells-out-25-billion-for-51-stake-in-west-african-iron-ore-project-5682.htm

[109] https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/the-billionaire-behind-the-vale/

[110] https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/the-billionaire-behind-the-vale/

[111] https://www.smh.com.au/business/rio-in-700m-settlement-for-guinea-ore-20110421-1dqk7.html

[112] https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/07/30/le-mystere-des-700-millions-de-dollars-de-rio-tinto_1795677/

[113] https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/the-billionaire-behind-the-vale/

[114] https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/beny-steinmetz-group-resources-must-publicly-address-questions-over-guinea-mining-concession/

[115] https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-arrest-french-citizen-obstructing-foreign-bribery-and

[116] Soros et l’Afrique, liaisons dangereuses – Valeurs actuelles

[117] https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/corruption-arrest-us-puts-beny-steinmetz-group-resources-frame/

[118] https://fcpablog.com/2014/07/26/cilins-jailed-two-years-for-obstructing-fcpa-mining-investig/

[119] https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/the-billionaire-behind-the-vale/ ; https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3194258/BSGR-execs-signed-over-5-stake-to-Contes-wife-for-Simandou-concession.html

[120] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-steinmetz-timeline-idUSKBN29R2AA