![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-01.jpg\")
<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Endless sand. Like a nightmare. A landscape in which no point can be distinguished to grasp it with thoughts, in which there is no right direction. It is called Mauritania and is one of the poorest countries in the world (157th<\/sup>), as almost two-thirds of the people live here on less than US $ 5 a day and cannot yet read or write[1]<\/a>. You might think it is a caring nation, whose foreign policy is limited to seeking help from richer countries and avoiding socially and economically unsustainable conflicts.<\/p>\n But it’s not like that. In a globalized world, every piece is irreplaceable. It is difficult to perceive, but the imbalances on which the weak thread between peace and war rests also take into account Mauritania, an element of peace in the dispute between Morocco and the Saharawi people which guarantees reception areas for refugees from different tribal wars in West Africa, but above all what alters the balance of the Cold War which, over the past decade, has turned the Persian Gulf into a powder keg.<\/p>\n But Mauritania is a capricious and insecure international partner because of its extreme poverty and weakness. It is a country far behind other African countries, the scene of continuous coups d’etat whose population has not yet had universal access to essential rights in Europe for over a century. In fact, slavery was banned here in 1981, but it wasn’t until 2007 that it became a crime in Mauritania to keep a man in chains[2]<\/a>. Even so, over 90,000 people are still slaves today[3]<\/a>. For some crimes, if you live outside the city, you will always be stoned to death[4]<\/a>: for apostasy, blasphemy, adultery and homosexuality[5]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The trade balance survives thanks to natural resources and fishing (together 90% of exports) but these are constantly fluctuating markets[6]<\/a>. Only 1% of the territory is made up of arable land, so we must focus on the relatively recently discovered oil and gas fields[7]<\/a>. Military elites play politics, no one else can raise their voice and protest, which makes Mauritania pretty darn unstable (also for foreign investors).<\/p>\n After all, it is a nation that on its own would never have existed if the deserts had been sewn together that no one wanted from Morocco, Algeria, Senegal and Mali. A vast area, twice the size of Spain, home to just four and a half million people who flock to the 755 km long Atlantic coast or near Senegal, or to the south where monsoons allow breeding and l horticulture most of the year[8]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Obviously in such conditions there are a lot of populations that affect the territory and they are nomads and they are in perpetual struggle with each other \u2013 like the Berbers and the Arabs who came here after the fall of the Roman Empire , for the massacre between the Bafours and the Soninke[9]<\/a>. There is talk of a time when the Sahara was less than a third of what it is today and was still full of fields and cattle, but in the centuries that followed the deterioration of general conditions continued. also accompanied by an increase in inter-ethnic disputes[10]<\/a>. The last profitable business was to enslave people and make money by selling it to European or Arab merchants[11]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The power whirlwind carousel<\/strong><\/p>\n On November 28, 1960, President Moktar Ould Daddah proclaimed the independence of Mauritania<\/strong>[12]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n French colonization came late (second half of the 19th<\/sup> century): from 1854, General Louis Faidherbe gradually subjugated all the territories and imposed a protectorate in 1904[13]<\/a>, but even that did not put an end to the violence between the tribes. In 1958 autonomy was obtained through a referendum[14]<\/a> and in 1960 the Islamic Republic of Mauritania gained independence.<\/p>\n Paris is happy: until 1966, it kept 3,000 soldiers in military bases in Mauritania, but until 1974, France sold weapons and military training to the government of Moktar Ould Daddah[15]<\/a>. As soon as the French liberalize the arms market, coups d’\u00e9tat will take place every two years, until the military victory of Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, who will manage to maintain together a dictatorial and violent regime between 1984 and 2003 \u2013 but after his assassination, the tournament will be again until Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz takes power in 2008.<\/p>\n From the 1970s, however, a new actor appeared in the region: the Saharawi people, made up of Berber nomadic tribes who, unlike the ten tribes scattered across the Sahara, perceive themselves as a single ethnic group and have a single municipality asks for the nation[16]<\/a> \u2013 and for reasons of geopolitical interest, he still fights today to preserve a country which he can call his own[17]<\/a>, also because the country which they call theirs, in the south of Morocco, is very rich in phosphates and Rabat does not intend to release it[18]<\/a>.<\/p>\n It was the Polisario Front that enabled the end of Mauritania’s first president and unleashed an organized war that culminated in the bombing of Nouakchott[19]<\/a>. Until the beginning of this century, the Polisario Front, the armed wing of the Saharawi people, participated in all the Mauritanian civil wars on the basis that it felt itself to be part owner of the nation[20]<\/a>. It is only in recent years that the Sahrawis, aware that their treatment in Mauritania is better than persecution by Moroccans, have become an element of stability in the country[21]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The other moment of stability comes with the dictatorship of Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya introducing the multiparty system but in a situation where the personal secretariat of the president selects the electoral bodies, bans the dissident press and uses and carries state money. like theirs \u2013 so paradoxically this situation has helped to create a common popular conscience, which finds a way out in the protests of 1994 and 1996[22]<\/a>, when the dictator is publicly accused of fraud[23]<\/a>. Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya resisted an assassination attempt in 2003[24]<\/a> but gave in to the 2005 mutiny of the Military Council for Justice and Democracy (MCJD) led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall[25]<\/a> (a steward of Taya who appointed him chief of the security forces. in 1987)[26]<\/a> at.<\/p>\n Vall offers encouraging signs: amnesty for prisoners for political crimes; two-year period for elections; in 2006, he called a widely recognized referendum on constitutional reforms, one of which was to limit the president to two terms that will last no more than six years but five years[27]<\/a>. An even more important fact: During his reign, Mohamed Valli managed to establish important diplomatic relations with the United States and to maintain the ties that already existed with Israel[28]<\/a>. Mauritania is one of the few Muslim countries to openly engage in Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n The Polisario Front has its roots in the 1970s when it was founded to counter Spanish colonialism<\/strong><\/p>\n This choice of fronts in international politics also survives the fact that Vall loses the 2007 election won by Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi[29]<\/a>: the first democratically elected president in Mauritania, which is a signal of great success on a global scale: the National Democratic The Institute for International Affairs (NDI)[30]<\/a>, which participated in the vote, writes in the conclusions of its report that, despite its still very fragile reality, Mauritania experienced for the first time a real democratic confrontation \u2013 an event that marks an important historical turning point[31]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The years of Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz<\/strong><\/p>\n General Ould Abdel Aziz outside the presidential palace on August 7, 2008, a day after the coup he organized<\/strong><\/p>\n This creates a problem in the Persian Gulf, where the star of Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan is on the rise and those who oppose the grand alliance are being fought. Therefore, Vall and his successor Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi are also seen as enemies simply because they have good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, Turkey and Lebanon. After fifteen months, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, a friend of the United Arab Emirates, deposed the president in a coup, overthrew democratic institutions and promised a change in international politics[32]<\/a>. From 2009, the regime’s main antagonist will be the Tewassoul party, which is closely linked to its Muslim Brotherhood[33]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz was born in December 1956 in Akjoujt, a small town in western Mauritania known for its copper and gold mines[34]<\/a>. The “white” moor of a tribe of Arab-Berber warriors, Oulad Bou Sbaa (literally “son of lions”)[35]<\/a>, spent most of his childhood in Senegal then entered the military academy of Meknes in Morocco in age 20. At that time, Rabat was an ally of Mauritania against the Sahrawis. He took the Muslim name of Abdel Aziz and received the rank of infantry lieutenant. Between 1981 and 1982, he studied in Algeria and then joined the army[36]<\/a>. From December 12, 1984, he became assistant to the president of Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya and had the opportunity to attend several important schools until he obtained the rank of captain[37]<\/a>.<\/p>\n 1987 entrusts Taya Ould Abdel Aziz with the organization of the Presidential Security Battalion (BASEP)[38]<\/a>, a military elite of at least 500 men, supposed to protect the head of state. Officially, the group is headed by the Ministry of Defense, but in practice it takes orders directly from the president[39]<\/a>. In 1991, Abdel Aziz was already a battalion commander in the army general staff and, after the very competitive elections of January 1992, in which Taya was elected president, he attended the state school. -Major general of K\u00e9nitra in Morocco, in order to receive the post. Deputy Commander of the Sixth Military Region in 1994[40]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The captain becomes an irreplaceable reference for Sid’Ahmed Taya, especially after having foiled the coup of 2003 and effectively suppressed the anti-government conspiracies of 2003 and 2004[41]<\/a>. For this, he will receive the Medal of Merit from the Commander of the National Order and the rank of Colonel[42]<\/a>. On August 3, 2005, Colonel Ould Abdel Aziz and Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall (his cousin[43]<\/a>) declared the outgoing president deposed during a meeting of the army staff. No one protests, no shots are fired, no one is imprisoned or tortured[44]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Ould Abdel Aziz was appointed Commander of the General Staff of the Presidency of the Republic in September 2007. In January 2008, he obtained the rank of General and received confirmation of his leadership at BASEP. For the first time, he entered BASEP, an international projector[45]<\/a>. To this end, he met Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Minister of Defense of the United Arab Emirates and a man at the center of the power plan in which Dubai is involved with Riyadh and certain capitals of the Persian Gulf, in particular against Iran, Turkey, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood which is on the side of democracy in Mauritania and therefore constitutes an obstacle to the objectives of Ould Abdel Aziz[46]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Guard of troops after army seized state radio in 2008 coup<\/strong>[47]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n The next season will be hell: escalating al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, much lower than expected oil revenues, steep food price hikes, smuggling and uncontrollable corruption lead to popular discontent[48]<\/a>, street unrest and quarrels in the palaces of politics which poison the entire political landscape[49]<\/a>.<\/p>\n In this climate, three days after the third anniversary of the coup d’\u00e9tat in 2005, the government announced a comprehensive restructuring of the military and security apparatus: without any explanation, Abdelhi Abdel Aziz left their post as commander of BASEP Mohammed Ould Ghazouani as head of the army and his colleague F\u00e9lix N\u00e9gri as chief of staff of the National Guard and Ahmed Ould Bekrine as chief of staff of the national gendarmerie[50]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The reaction of the four displaced generals, supported by Colonel Mohammed Ould Hady, Director General of National Security, was lightning fast: on the morning of August 6, 2008, the presidential guard troops led by General Abdel Aziz surrounded the presidential palace, the office of the prime minister, the office of the state broadcaster and declares the blocking of access to the international airport[51]<\/a>; then they arrest President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed el-Waghef and Interior Minister Mohamed Ould R’zeizm[52]<\/a>. A brief statement on television announces the transfer of power to a commission made up entirely of senior military officials[53]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The coup d’etat is condemned almost everywhere: the United States, with the African Union, demand the release of the imprisoned Mauritanian leaders; The EU threatens to stop development aid. The condemnation also comes from regional powers in South Africa and Nigeria[54]<\/a>. In the absence of satisfactory responses from the new administration, the world creates facts: the United States suspends grants and security assistance to the Millennium Challenge Corporation; The African Union suspends membership in Mauritania and extends sanctions; in April of the same year, the European Union, under the French presidency, ceased its aid operations for two years; the development projects of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are also on hold[55]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The new leader has the promises of Abu Dhabi in his pocket and tries to convince everyone that he is a Democrat by standing for the next presidential election, which will take place in due course, on May 30, 2009, with a possible second round , which is tentatively scheduled for June 13[56]<\/a>. The political reaction is harsh: Ahmed Ould Daddah, head of the Assembly of Democratic Forces (RFD), which includes the Islamic Brothers and former President Abdullahi, questions the legitimacy of Ould Abdel Aziz’s candidacy \u2013 the constitution prohibits the candidacy for the army \u2013 and threatens to boycott the elections\u2026 Abdel Aziz’s reaction: he resigns from all military posts[57]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Abdel Aziz and the opposition give in to international pressure and agree in Dakar to postpone the elections to July 18 and allow a government of national unity during the transition to include 26 ministerial posts shared between supporters of the junta and the opposition become[58]<\/a>. Moulay Ould Mohamed Laghdaf was then appointed Prime Minister[59]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (left) and Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (right)<\/strong><\/p>\n From that moment on, Abdel Aziz campaigned and went to the poorest and most disadvantaged neighborhoods (we often see him in Kebe, the slums of Nouakchott[60]<\/a>) to promise new schools, hospitals and streets[61]<\/a>. Abdel Aziz wins in the first round and obtains 52.6% of preferences[62]<\/a>. Everything is being done under the watchful eye of an independent commission made up of the African Union, the Arab League, the International Organization of La Francophonie and the Organization of the Islamic Conference: the commission will reject the allegations of fraud of the opposition[63]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The result of the elections has the immediate effect of restoring international agreements: NATO resumes its security programs with Mauritania, the European Union lifts sanctions and resumes its aid programs, and the IMF will join the others in September of the same year[64]<\/a>. The new president faces a mix of violent regional and local extremists, whose numbers have risen sharply in recent years[65]<\/a>. It encourages constructive political debates between different ethnic groups, sets up special courts and strengthens security with police forces and a well-trained army[66]<\/a>: a strategy that will meet with some success, especially in the area of \u200b\u200bjihadist violence[67]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Economically, too, Abdel Aziz seems to be doing well \u2013 at least compared to his predecessors, who managed to present even false macroeconomic accounts as negative[68]<\/a>. Completely breaking away from Taya’s management, he is working hard on fairly complex reforms such as the restructuring of the Ministry of Economy and Development (MAED)[69]<\/a>. In 2013, the economy grew by 6.3% and achieved a significant trade balance[70]<\/a>, which will have a positive impact on the 2014 presidential election. He will undoubtedly win these elections with 81.89% of the vote[71]<\/a>. The following September, he set up a National Committee to Combat Corruption and Mismanagement (CNLCG) to strengthen engagement against endemic corruption[72]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The social question, however, remains largely unresolved: unemployment, widespread poverty, gender discrimination, violations of human rights, the secular issue of slavery, despotic and autocratic management of a man who circumvents all institutions in imposing itself on its omnipresence in all sectors … these aspects make this country a place far removed from a modern democracy[73]<\/a>.<\/p>\n In 2017, Abdel Aziz called a referendum after failing to gain parliamentary support for further reforms. The changes are significant: the High Court of Justice, the High Islamic Council and the Mediator of the Republic would be integrated into a single institution, the Supreme Council of Fatwa \u2013 a sensational novelty which places the control of justice in the hands of the Religion Islamic[74]<\/a>. Despite attempts to boycott the opposition, the referendum was a success: a turnout of 53.73%, a YES victory with 85% of the vote[75]<\/a>. In 2019 he does not appoint again and therefore accepts the legally established limits, but the man he sponsored, the former Minister of Defense Ould Ghazouani, becomes the new president with 52% of the vote, which ensures the continuity of the regime[76]<\/a>: he and Abdel Aziz have known each other since then, they attended the Meknes academy together and are each other’s best friends[77]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The end of the Abdel Aziz era<\/strong><\/p>\n The results of the vote in the constitutional referendum of August 2017<\/strong><\/p>\n First of all, everyone sees the new president as a puppet. Abdel Aziz is the one who controls international relations and therefore the portfolios[78]<\/a>. His allies in the Persian Gulf are loyal to him, but in return, Ould Abdel Aziz must engage on uncomfortable fronts like Libya, where he sits alongside opponents of the European Union and most African states[79]<\/a>. This leads to an unexpected reaction from President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, who announced a sudden government reshuffle in the summer of 2020 by appointing Ould Abdel Aziz, the prime minister, in light of the results of a report by the commission of parliamentary inquiry (PIC)[80]<\/a> set up to investigate the times when the Aziz government was in charge, that he was ousted from his post as prime minister[81]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The 800-page report, accusing Ould Abdel Aziz of carrying out several illegal operations[82]<\/a>, speaks of procurement violations of 109 projects worth $ 1.4 billion, such as personal management of oil revenues and the sale of state property to Nouakchott, the activities of the Chinese fishing company Pully Hong Dong[83]<\/a>, and the liquidation of a state-owned enterprise that supplies food throughout the country[84]<\/a>. Besides the former president, there are many officials involved in the crimes who, after hearing from investigators, admit the allegations and say they acted on the instructions of Ould Abdel Aziz[85]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz with his son Bedrn, owner of the \u201cRahma de Bienfaisance\u201d foundation, which is under investigation for public money laundering<\/strong><\/p>\n The accused’s confessions trigger an apocalypse: the passports of former Prime Minister Yaya Ould Hademine, the former director general of the National Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM) Mohamed Abdallah Ould Oudaa \u2013 a state-owned company \u2013 and of the former minister of urbanization and current director of the National Airlines Mauritania Airlines Internationale, Amal Mint Maouloud are confiscated[86]<\/a>.<\/p>\n A few days later, on August 17, former President Ould Abdel Aziz was arrested for corruption and public appropriation and released on bail[87]<\/a>, although his passport remained confiscated[88]<\/a>. Bedr Ould Mohamed Abdel Aziz, son of former President Bedr Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, is also under investigation for money laundering: Bedr and the Rahma de Bienfaisance Foundation are suspected of using public funds for private purposes, leading to the confiscation of their assets, including trucks belonging to the foundation[89]<\/a>.<\/p>\n In December, Ould Abdel Aziz had to give up the leadership of the party he had founded, the Union for the Republic[90]<\/a>. He reserves inflammatory words for El Ghazouani and his government and complains of being the victim of a “settlement of ancient tales<\/em>“[91]<\/a> and that “the corrupt have returned to power thanks to a gentle coup<\/em>[92]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> and are showing up. now as fighters against corruption<\/em>\u201d[93]<\/a>: State funds allocated to the presidency increased by 88% with Ghazouani and those allocated to parliament by 30%, so that each deputy received 250,000 ouguiya (approximately 6,000 euros) per year to approve the theses of the commission of inquiry[94]<\/a>.<\/p>\n In March of this year, Attorney General Ahmedou Ould Abdallah[95]<\/a> again called for the pre-trial detention of Ould Abdel Aziz, two former prime ministers, five former government ministers and four businessmen[96]<\/a>. The AFP news agency reports that the allegations against the former president are numerous and include money laundering, embezzlement and obstruction of justice[97]<\/a>. The reason: The trial is approaching \u2013 at the time of this writing, Ould Abdel Aziz is on parole and has to report to the police three times a week[98]<\/a>.<\/p>\n In the meantime, the new president has started to deal with his country’s foreign policy. The first decision was to sever exclusive ties with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and to seek the support and guidance of the European Union, African Union and United Nations[99]<\/a> to launch a project of openness of Mauritania \u2013 a bet we want him to win.<\/p>\n Mauritania, a fragile country with an uncertain future<\/strong><\/p>\n In more than 50% of the villages, drinking water is still provided once a week by international NGOs<\/strong><\/p>\n According to the Cadre Harmonis\u00e9 analysis of March 2021, around 196,000 people in Mauritania will need food aid in March-May 2021 and 457,000 during the dry season (June-August 2021)[100]<\/a>. The persistence of civil conflicts in Mali has also resulted in the entry of large numbers of refugees into Mauritania: according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are currently more than 70,500 displaced people in the region. countries that are thirsty and hungry[101]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The new presidency had brought some hope thanks to weak economic growth, but the pandemic caused a drop of 2.2% in just one year and things took a turn for the worse as the trade deficit fell from 8% to about 11% of GDP[102]<\/a>. The numerous reforms in certain sectors like agriculture and the corporate sector, like increasing production in the extractive sector after the expansion of gold mines, could help alleviate a really difficult situation[103]<\/a>, but it all depends on too many variables which are inherently unpredictable and uncertain, such as drought, political problems, social conflicts.<\/p>\n All this represents a poisoned mixture which makes Mauritania a country very dependent on humanitarian aid and foreign funding: according to the Financial Tracking Service, the country benefited in 2020 from donations from various international organizations (including the IMF, the ADB , the EU and the World Bank) for nearly 76 million dollars[104]<\/a> \u2013 or 4.5% of GDP[105]<\/a>. Human rights, episodes of violence on the part of officials, arbitrary arrests, torture, ill-treatment, inhuman conditions of detention, sexual abuse, severe restrictions on freedom of expression, of religion , meeting or association and appalling slavery persist[106]<\/a>.<\/p>\n But in 18 months, this ant has shifted the balance in the dispute within the Arab world \u2013 in the direction of peace. Often it would take so little to tackle and solve problems that seem so immense. Giving confidence and strength to a new Mauritania takes little less than the commitment necessary to support armed peace in the Middle East. A few million dollars well invested and free of men and women could thrive outside the desert \u2013 out of slavery, violence, starvation.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n [1]<\/a> https:\/\/santandertrade.com\/en\/portal\/analyse-markets\/mauritania\/economic-outline<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.macrotrends.net\/countries\/MRT\/mauritania\/poverty-rate<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.infomercatiesteri.it\/quadro_macroeconomico.php?id_paesi=150#<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.cia.gov\/the-world-factbook\/countries\/mauritania\/<\/a><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> https:\/\/santandertrade.com\/en\/portal\/analyse-markets\/mauritania\/economic-outline<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.macrotrends.net\/countries\/MRT\/mauritania\/poverty-rate<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.infomercatiesteri.it\/quadro_macroeconomico.php?id_paesi=150#<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.cia.gov\/the-world-factbook\/countries\/mauritania\/<\/a><\/p>\n http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/2\/hi\/africa\/6938032.stm<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> https:\/\/www.globalslaveryindex.org\/2018\/findings\/regional-analysis\/africa\/<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/latest\/news\/2021\/04\/death-penalty-in-2020-facts-and-figures\/#:~:text=Only%20two%20countries%2C%20USA%20and,death%20sentences%20in%20the%20region.&text=In%20Asia%2DPacific%20Bangladesh%2C%20China,carried%20out%20executions%20in%202020<\/a>.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> https:\/\/www.ecoi.net\/en\/document\/2043672.html<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> https:\/\/www.infomercatiesteri.it\/quadro_macroeconomico.php?id_paesi=150#<\/a><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> https:\/\/www.offshore-technology.com\/comment\/current-market-impacts-mauritania-senegal-oil-gas\/<\/a><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> https:\/\/www.worldometers.info\/world-population\/mauritania-population\/<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> https:\/\/books.google.it\/books?id=SPBfnT_E1mgC&pg=PA35&lpg=PA35&dq=bafur+mauritania&source=bl&ots=uIcgv9Qd1n&sig=ACfU3U2hHt2JZikoP-YZCtp7Wd3jG9fGng&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiBxIiFhpnwAhXM_qQKHUqxCakQ6AEwEnoECA0QAw#v=onepage&q=bafur%20mauritania&f=false<\/a> \u201cEthinc Group Of Africa And The Middle East\u201d \u2013 John A. Shoup \u2013 2011 \u2013 Pag 35<\/em><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> https:\/\/www.everyculture.com\/Ma-Ni\/Mauritania.html<\/a><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> https:\/\/www.worldatlas.com\/articles\/what-is-the-ethnic-composition-of-mauritania.html#:~:text=The%20population%20of%20Mauritania%20is,while%20the%20Haratins%20are%2040%25<\/a>.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> https:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/1081985\/politique\/le-jour-ou-le-premier-president-de-la-mauritanie-mokhtar-ould-daddah-sest-confie-a-jeune-afrique\/<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> https:\/\/biography.yourdictionary.com\/louis-leon-cesar-faidherbe<\/a><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> https:\/\/en.linkfang.org\/wiki\/1958_Mauritanian_constitutional_referendum<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> https:\/\/uca.edu\/politicalscience\/dadm-project\/sub-saharan-africa-region\/mauritania-1960-present\/<\/a> ; https:\/\/amp.it.what-this.com\/1306218\/1\/moktar-ould-daddah.html<\/a><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2013\/jul\/16\/women-western-sahara-independence-morroco<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/global-development\/gallery\/2015\/nov\/21\/desert-schools-sahrawi-refugee-camps-morocco-western-sahara-in-pictures<\/a><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/2\/hi\/africa\/3208012.stm<\/a><\/p>\n [18]<\/a> https:\/\/www.msn.com\/en-us\/news\/world\/fighting-in-morocco-may-present-biden-with-fresh-africa-crisis-amid-covid-surge\/ar-BB1b1Yfg<\/a><\/p>\n [19]<\/a> https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/topic\/Polisario-Front<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.files.ethz.ch\/isn\/164495\/pub1152.pdf<\/a> ; Geoffrey Jensen, \u201cWar and Insurgency in The Western Sahara\u201d ,<\/em>2013 – pag.37<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, “Mauritania: A Saharan Frontier State<\/em>“, in \u201cJournal of North African Studies<\/em>\u201c, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, Routledge, London 2005<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> 2021.03.22 CountryWatch on Mauritania<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> http:\/\/archive.ipu.org\/parline-e\/reports\/arc\/2207_96.htm<\/a><\/p>\n [23]<\/a> https:\/\/2009-2017.state.gov\/j\/drl\/rls\/hrrpt\/2000\/af\/855.htm<\/a><\/p>\n [24]<\/a> https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/archive\/mauritania-puts-down-coup-attempt-2003-06-08<\/a><\/p>\n [25]<\/a> https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2005\/aug\/03\/1<\/a><\/p>\n [26]<\/a> https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/mauritania\/military-junta-mauritania-names-new-head-state<\/a><\/p>\n [27]<\/a> https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/place\/Mauritania\/History#ref941397<\/a><\/p>\n [28]<\/a> https:\/\/www.refworld.org\/docid\/473c5576c.html<\/a><\/p>\n [29]<\/a> https:\/\/www.electionguide.org\/elections\/id\/2036\/<\/a><\/p>\n [30]<\/a> https:\/\/www.ndi.org\/<\/a><\/p>\n [31]<\/a> https:\/\/www.ndi.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2376_report_engpdf_09152008.pdf<\/a>\u00a0 \u201c2007 Mauritanian Presidential Election an Assessment Mission Report\u201d – National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) 2007 – pag. 16<\/em><\/p>\n [32]<\/a> https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2008\/08\/14\/mauritania-s-coup-domestic-complexities-and-international-dilemmas-pub-20392<\/a><\/p>\n [33]<\/a> https:\/\/www.bna.bh\/AboutBNA.aspx?cms=iQRpheuphYtJ6pyXUGiNqladb1RZ0e3I<\/a> ; https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20141006074045\/http:\/\/www.bna.bh\/portal\/en\/news\/609752<\/a> ; https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/archive\/bahrain-fm-reiterates-stance-on-muslim-brotherhood\/172889<\/a><\/p>\n [34]<\/a> https:\/\/abidjan.net\/qui\/profil.asp?id=790<\/a><\/p>\n [35]<\/a> https:\/\/www.cidob.org\/biografias_lideres_politicos\/africa\/mauritania\/mohammed_ould_abdelaziz<\/a><\/p>\n [36]<\/a> https:\/\/www.cidob.org\/biografias_lideres_politicos\/africa\/mauritania\/mohammed_ould_abdelaziz<\/a><\/p>\n [37]<\/a> \u201cIngerences \u00e9trang\u00e8res dans les crises politiques en Guin\u00e9e et en Mauritanie de 2008 \u00e0 2013\u201d \u2013 Darlane Mengue <> M\u2019Engouang \u2013 2017 – pag. 136<\/em><\/p>\n [38]<\/a> https:\/\/www.dcaf.ch\/sites\/default\/files\/publications\/documents\/BrydenN%E2%80%99DiayeENGLISH.pdf<\/a> \u201cSecurity Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities\u201d –\u00a0 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N\u2019Diaye (Eds) –\u00a0 pag. 157<\/em><\/p>\n [39]<\/a> http:\/\/www.smallarmssurvey.org\/fileadmin\/docs\/B-Occasional-papers\/SAS-OP24-Mauritania-FR.pdf<\/a> \u201cArmes l\u00e9g\u00e8res et s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Mauritanie\u201d – St\u00e9phanie P\u00e9zard avec Anne-Kathrin Glatz \u2013 2010 \u2013 page 32<\/em><\/p>\n [40]<\/a> https:\/\/www.cidob.org\/biografias_lideres_politicos\/africa\/mauritania\/mohammed_ould_abdelaziz<\/a><\/p>\n [41]<\/a> \u201cHistorical Dictionary of Mauritania\u201d – 2008 – Anthony G. Pazzanita<\/p>\n [42]<\/a> https:\/\/www.cidob.org\/biografias_lideres_politicos\/africa\/mauritania\/mohammed_ould_abdelaziz<\/a><\/p>\n [43]<\/a> https:\/\/media.africaportal.org\/documents\/The-Legacy-of-Mauritania-Colonels-2016.pdf<\/a> \u201cThe Legacy of Mauritania’s Colonels: West Africa’s Next Crisis?\u201d – Boubacar N\u2019Diaye Ph.D \u2013\u00a0 2016 – Page 16<\/em><\/p>\n [44]<\/a> https:\/\/www.cairn.info\/revue-politique-etrangere-2005-4-page-809.htm<\/a><\/p>\n [45]<\/a> https:\/\/www.google.it\/books\/edition\/Ing%C3%A9rences_%C3%A9trang%C3%A8res_dans_les_crises\/oVR2DgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Oulad+bousbaa+trib%C3%B9&pg=PA136&printsec=frontcover<\/a> \u201cIngerences \u00e9trang\u00e8res dans les crises politiques en Guin\u00e9e et en Mauritanie de 2008 \u00e0 2013\u201d \u2013 Darlane Mengue <> M\u2019Engouang \u2013 2017 – pag. 137<\/em><\/p>\n [46]<\/a> 2009.11.05 Mauritanian President Meets UAE FM; 2009.11.05 Mauritanian President and Sheikh Abdullah discuss bilateral ties; 2009.09.18 His Majesty exchanges Eid greetings with Arab and Islamic leaders<\/p>\n [47]<\/a> https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-africa-13882166<\/a><\/p>\n [48]<\/a> https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2008\/8\/21\/mauritanias-coup-in-the-making<\/a><\/p>\n [49]<\/a> \u201cThe Legacy of Mauritania’s Colonels: West Africa’s Next Crisis?\u201d – Boubacar N\u2019Diaye Ph.D \u2013\u00a0 2016 <\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n [50]<\/a> https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2008\/08\/14\/mauritania-s-coup-domestic-complexities-and-international-dilemmas-pub-20392<\/a><\/p>\n [51]<\/a> https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2008\/8\/7\/coup-leaders-vow-mauritania-vote<\/a><\/p>\n [52]<\/a> https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2008\/08\/14\/mauritania-s-coup-domestic-complexities-and-international-dilemmas-pub-20392<\/a><\/p>\n [53]<\/a> https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2008\/08\/14\/mauritania-s-coup-domestic-complexities-and-international-dilemmas-pub-20392<\/a><\/p>\n [54]<\/a> https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2008\/8\/7\/coup-leaders-vow-mauritania-vote<\/a><\/p>\n [55]<\/a> https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/anuari\/2010\/aarticles\/Fakir_Boucek_Mauritania_en.pdf<\/a> page 2<\/p>\n [56]<\/a> https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/anuari\/2010\/aarticles\/Fakir_Boucek_Mauritania_en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [57]<\/a> https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/anuari\/2010\/aarticles\/Fakir_Boucek_Mauritania_en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [58]<\/a> http:\/\/www1.rfi.fr\/actufr\/articles\/114\/article_81646.asp<\/a><\/p>\n [59]<\/a> https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/20090812-president-aziz-confirms-pm-appoints-new-government-<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n [60]<\/a> https:\/\/www.ifri.org\/sites\/default\/files\/atoms\/files\/afrique_en_questions_23_en_-_alain_antil.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [61]<\/a> https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/anuari\/2010\/aarticles\/Fakir_Boucek_Mauritania_en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [62]<\/a> https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/anuari\/2010\/aarticles\/Fakir_Boucek_Mauritania_en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [63]<\/a> https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/anuari\/2010\/aarticles\/Fakir_Boucek_Mauritania_en.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-02.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-03.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-04.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-05.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-06.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-07.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-08.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/ibiworld.eu\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/05\/FRA013-09.jpg\")
<\/p>\n